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Abstract
Recent studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of
deep convolutional neural networks against adversarial
examples. Inspired by the observation that the intrinsic
dimension of image data is much smaller than its pixel
space dimension and the vulnerability of neural networks
grows with the input dimension, we propose to embed high-
dimensional input images into a low-dimensional space
to perform classification. However, arbitrarily projecting
the input images to a low-dimensional space without reg-
ularization will not improve the robustness of deep neural
networks. Leveraging optimal transport theory, we pro-
pose a new framework, Optimal Transport Classifier (OT-
Classifier), and derive an objective that minimizes the dis-
crepancy between the distribution of the true label and
the distribution of the OT-Classifier output. Experimen-
tal results on several benchmark datasets show that, our
proposed framework achieves state-of-the-art performance
against strong adversarial attack methods.
1. Introduction
Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been widely used
for tackling numerous machine learning problems that were
once believed to be challenging. With their remarkable abil-
ity of fitting training data, DNNs have achieved revolution-
ary successes in many fields such as computer vision, natu-
ral language progressing, and robotics. However, they were
shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples that are gen-
erated by adding carefully crafted perturbations to origi-
nal images. The adversarial perturbations can arbitrarily
change the network’s prediction but often too small to affect
human recognition [26, 12]. This phenomenon brings out
security concerns for practical applications of deep learn-
ing.
Two main types of attack settings have been considered
in recent research [10, 3, 6, 22]: black-box and white-box
settings. In the black-box setting, the attacker can pro-
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Figure 1. Overview of OT-Classifier framework
vide any inputs and receive the corresponding predictions.
However, the attacker cannot get access to the gradients or
model parameters under this setting; whereas in the white-
box setting, the attacker is allowed to analytically compute
the model’s gradients, and have full access to the model ar-
chitecture and weights. In this paper, we focus on defending
against the white-box attack which is the harder task.
Recent work [25] presented both theoretical arguments
and an empirical one-to-one relationship between input di-
mension and adversarial vulnerability, showing that the vul-
nerability of neural networks grows with the input dimen-
sion. Therefore, reducing the data dimension may help im-
prove the robustness of deep neural networks. Furthermore,
a consensus in the high-dimensional data analysis commu-
nity is that, a method working well on the high-dimensional
data is because the data is not really of high-dimension [14].
These high-dimensional data, such as images, are actually
embedded in a much lower dimensional space. Hence, care-
fully reducing the input dimension may improve the robust-
ness of the model without sacrificing performance.
Inspired by the observation that the intrinsic dimension
of image data is actually much smaller than its pixel space
dimension [14] and the vulnerability of a model grows with
its input dimension [25], we propose a defense framework
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that embeds input images into a low-dimensional space us-
ing a deep encoder and performs classification based on the
latent embedding with a classifier network. However, arbi-
trarily projecting input images to a low-dimensional space
based on a deep encoder does not guarantee improving the
robustness of the model, because there are a lot of map-
ping functions including pathological ones from the raw
input space to the low-dimensional space capable of min-
imizing the classification loss. To constrain the mapping
function, we employ distribution regularization in the em-
bedding space leveraging optimal transport theory. We call
our new classification framework Optimal Transport Clas-
sifier (OT-Classifier). To be more specific, we introduce a
discriminator in the latent space which tries to separate the
generated code vectors from the encoder network and the
ideal code vectors sampled from a prior distribution, i.e., a
standard Gaussian distribution. Employing a similar pow-
erful competitive mechanism as demonstrated by Genera-
tive Adversarial Networks [9], the discriminator enforces
the embedding space of the model to follow the prior distri-
bution.
In our OT-Classifier framework, the encoder and dis-
criminator structures together project the input data to a
low-dimensional space with a nice shape, then the classifier
performs prediction based on the low-dimensional embed-
ding. Based on the optimal transport theory, the proposed
OT-Classifier minimizes the discrepancy between the distri-
bution of the true label and the distribution of the framework
output, thus only retaining important features for classifica-
tion in the embedding space. With a small embedding di-
mension, the effect of the adversarial perturbation is largely
diminished through the projection process.
We compare OT-Classifier with other state-of-the-art de-
fense methods on MNIST, CIFAR10, STL10 and Tiny Im-
agenet. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed
OT-Classifier outperforms other defense methods by a large
margin. To sum up, this paper makes the following three
main contributions:
• A novel unified end-to-end robust deep neural net-
work framework against adversarial attacks is pro-
posed, where the input image is first projected to a
low-dimensional space and then classified.
• An objective is induced to minimize the optimal trans-
port cost between the true class distribution and the
framework output distribution, guiding the encoder
and discriminator to project the input image to a low-
dimensional space without losing important features
for classification.
• Extensive experiments demonstrate the robustness
of our proposed OT-Classifier framework under the
white-box attacks, and show that OT-Classifier com-
bined with adversarial training outperforms other
state-of-the-art approaches on several benchmark im-
age datasets.
2. Related Work
In this section, we summarize related work into three
categories: attack methods, defense mechanisms and op-
timal transport theory. We first discuss different white-box
attack methods, followed by a description of different de-
fense mechanisms against these attacks, and finally optimal
transport theory.
2.1. Attack Methods
Under the white-box setting, attackers have all informa-
tion about the targeted neural network, including network
structure and gradients. Most white-box attacks generate
adversarial examples based on the gradient of loss function
with respect to the input. An algorithm called fast gradi-
ent sign method (FGSM) was proposed in [10] which gen-
erates adversarial examples based on the sign of gradient.
Many other white-box attack methods have been proposed
recently [20, 5, 17, 4], and among them C&W and PGD
attacks have been widely used to test the robustness of ma-
chine learning models.
C&W attack: The adversarial attack method proposed
by Carlini and Wagner [4] is one of the strongest white-
box attack methods. They formulate the adversarial exam-
ple generating process as an optimization problem. The
proposed objective function aims at increasing the proba-
bility of the target class and minimizing the distance be-
tween the adversarial example and the original input image.
Therefore, C&W attack can be viewed as a gradient-descent
based adversarial attack.
PGD attack: The projected gradient descent attack is
proposed by [17], which finds adversarial examples in an -
ball of the image. The PGD attack updates in the direction
that decreases the probability of the original class most, then
projects the result back to the -ball of the input. An advan-
tage of PGD attack over C&W attack is that it allows direct
control of distortion level by changing , while for C&W
attack, one can only do so indirectly via hyper-parameter
tuning.
Both C&W attack and PGD attack have been frequently
used to benchmark the defense algorithms due to their ef-
fectiveness [2]. In this paper, we mainly use l∞-PGD un-
targeted attack to evaluate the effectiveness of the defense
method under white-box setting.
Instead of crafting different adversarial perturbation for
different input image, an algorithm was proposed by [19] to
construct a universal perturbation that causes natural images
to be misclassified. However, since this universal perturba-
tion is image-agnostic, it is usually larger than the image-
specific perturbation generated by PGD and C&W.
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2.2. Defense Mechanisms
Many works have been done to improve the robustness
of deep neural networks. To defend against adversarial ex-
amples, defenses that aim to increase model robustness fall
into three main categories: i) augmenting the training data
with adversarial examples to enhance the existing classi-
fiers [17, 21, 10]; ii) leveraging model-specific strategies
to enforce model properties such as smoothness [23]; and,
iii) trying to remove adversarial perturbations from the in-
puts [28, 24, 18]. We select three representative methods
that are effective under white-box setting.
Adversarial training: Augmenting the training data
with adversarial examples can increase the robustness of the
deep neural network. Madry et al. [17] recently introduced
a min-max formulation against adversarial attacks. The pro-
posed model is not only trained on the original dataset but
also adversarial example in the -ball of each input image.
Random Self-Ensemble: Another effective defense
method under white-box setting is RSE [15]. The authors
proposed a “noise layer”, which fuses output of each layer
with Gaussian noise. They empirically show that the noise
layer can help improve the robustness of deep neural net-
works. The noise layer is applied in both training and test-
ing phases, so the prediction accuracy will not be largely
affected.
Defense-GAN: Defense-GAN [24] leverages the expres-
sive capability of GANs to defend deep neural networks
against adversarial examples. It is trained to project in-
put images onto the range of the GAN’s generator to re-
move the effect of the adversarial perturbation. Another de-
fense method that uses the generative model to filter out
noise is MagNet proposed by [18]. However, the differ-
ences between OT-Classifier and the two methods are ob-
vious. OT-Classifier focus on reducing the dimension, and
performing classification based on the low-dimensional em-
bedding, while Defense-GAN and MagNet mainly apply
the generative model to filter out the adversarial noise, and
both Defense-GAN and MagNet perform classification on
the original dimension space. [24] showed that Defense-
GAN is more robust than MagNet, so we only compare with
Defense-GAN in the experiment.
2.3. Optimal Transport Theory
There are various ways to define the distance or diver-
gence between the target distribution and the model distri-
bution. In this paper, we turn to the optimal transport the-
ory1, which provides a much weaker topology than many
others. In real applications, data is usually embedded in a
space of a much lower dimension, such as a non-linear man-
ifold. Kullback-Leibler divergence, Jensen-Shannon diver-
1More details available at https://optimaltransport.
github.io/slides/
gence and Total Variation distance are not sensible cost
functions when learning distributions supported by lower
dimensional manifolds [1]. In contrast, the optimal trans-
port cost is more sensible in this setting.
Kantorovich’s distance induced by the optimal transport
problem is given by
Wc(PY , PC) := inf
Γ∈P(Y∼PY ,U∼PC)
E(Y,U)∼Γ {c(Y,U)} ,
where Γ ∈ P(Y ∼ PY , U ∼ PC) is the set of all joint
distributions of (Y,U) with marginals PY and PC , and
c(y, u) : U × U 7→ R+ is any measurable cost function.
Wc(PY , PC) measures the divergence between probability
distributions PY and PC .
When the probability measures are on a metric space, the
p-th root of Wc is called the p-Wasserstein distance. Re-
cently, Tolstikhin [27] introduced a new algorithm to build
a generative model of the target data distribution based on
the Wasserstein distance. The proposed generative model
can generate samples of better quality, as measured by the
FID score.
3. Proposed Framework: Optimal Transport
Classifier
We propose a novel defense framework, OT-Classifier,
which aims at projecting the image data to a low-
dimensional space to remove noise and stabilize the clas-
sification model by minimizing the optimal transport cost
between the true label distribution PY and the distribution
of the OT-Classifier output (PC). The encoder and discrim-
inator structures together help diminish the effect of the ad-
versarial perturbation by projecting input data to a space of
lower dimension, then the classifier part performs classifi-
cation based on the low-dimensional embedding.
3.1. Notations
In this paper, we use l∞ and l2 distortion metrics to mea-
sure similarity. We report l∞ distance in the normalized
[0, 1] space, so that a distortion of 0.031 corresponds to
8/256, and l2 distance as the total root-mean-square dis-
tortion normalized by the total number of pixels.
We use calligraphic letters for sets (i.e., X ), capital let-
ters for random variables (i.e.,X), and lower case letters for
their values (i.e., x). The probability distributions are de-
noted with capital letters (i.e., PX ) and corresponding den-
sities with lower case letters (i.e., pX ).
ImagesX ∈ X = Rd are projected to a low-dimensional
embedding vector Z ∈ Z = Rk through the encoder Qφ.
The discriminatorDγ discriminates between the generated
code Z˜ ∼ Qφ(Z|X) and the ideal code Z ∼ PZ . The
classifierCτ performs classification based on the generated
code Z˜, producing output U ∈ U = Rm, where m is the
number of classes. The label of X is denoted as Y ∈ U . An
overview of the framework is shown in Figure 1.
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3.2. Framework Details
At training stage, the encoder Qφ first maps the input x
to a low-dimensional space, resulting in generated code (z˜).
Another ideal code (z) is sampled from the prior distribu-
tion, and the discriminator Dγ discriminates between the
ideal code (positive data) and the generated code (negative
data). The classifier (Cτ ) predicts the image label based on
the generated code (z˜). Details of training process can be
found in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 Training OT-Classifier
1: Input: Regularization coefficient λ > 0, encoder Qφ,
discriminatorDγ , and classifier Cτ .
2: Note: ` stands for the cross-entropy loss.
3: while (φ, γ, τ) not converged do
4: Sample {(x1, y1), ..., (xn, yn)} from the training
set
5: Sample {z1, ..., zn} from the prior PZ
6: Sample z˜i fromQφ(Z|xi) for i = 1, ..., n
7: UpdateDγ by ascending the following objective by
1-step Adam:
λ
n
n∑
i=1
Dγ(zi)−Dγ(z˜i)
8: Update Qφ and Cτ by descending the following
objective by 1-step Adam:
1
n
n∑
i=1
`(Cτ (Qφ(xi)), yi)
9: UpdateQφ by ascending the following objective by
1-step Adam:
λ
n
n∑
i=1
Dγ(Qφ(xi))
10: end while
At inference time, only the encoderQφ and the classifier
Cτ are used. The input image x is first mapped to a low-
dimensional space by the encoder (z˜ = Qφ(x)), then the
latent code z˜ is fed into the classifier to obtain the predicted
label.
Our framework can be combined with other state-of-the-
art defense methods, such as adversarial training. Since the
dimension of the input images are reduced to a much lower
dimension, adversarial training also benefits from this di-
mension reduction. In the experiments, we combine OT-
classifier with adversarial training and compare it with other
defense methods.
3.3. Theoretical Analysis
The OT-Classifier framework embeds important classifi-
cation features by minimizing the discrepancy between the
distribution of the true label (PY ) and the distribution of the
framework output (PC). In the framework, the classifier
(PC(U |Z)) maps a latent code Z sampled from a fixed dis-
tribution in a latent space Z , to the output U ∈ U = Rm.
The density of OT-Classifier output is defined as follow:
pC(u) :=
∫
Z
pC(u|z)pZ(z)dz, ∀u ∈ U . (1)
In this paper we apply standard Gaussian as our prior
distribution PZ , but other priors may be used for different
cases. Assume there is an oracle f : X 7→ U assigning
the image data (X ∈ X ) its true label (Y ∈ U). To mini-
mize the optimal transport cost between the distribution of
the true label (PY ) and the distribution of the OT-Classifier
output (PC), it is sufficient to find a conditional distribution
Q(Z|X) such that its marginal distribution QZ is identical
to the prior distribution PZ .
Theorem 1 For PC as defined above with a deterministic
PC(U |Z) and any function C : Z 7→ U
inf
Γ∈P(Y∼PY ,U∼PC)
E(Y,U)∼Γ {`(Y,U)}
= inf
Q:QZ=PZ
EPXEQ(Z|X) {`(f(X),C(Z))} ,
where Γ ∈ P(Y ∼ PY , U ∼ PC) is the set of all joint
distributions of (Y,U) with marginals PY and PC , and
`(y, u) : U × U 7→ R+ is any measurable cost function.
QZ is the marginal distribution of Z when X ∼ PX and
Z ∼ Q(Z|X). (The proof is deferred to the Appendix. )
Therefore, optimizing over the objective on the r.h.s is
equivalent to minimizing the discrepancy between the true
label distribution (PY ) and the output distribution PC , thus
the important classification features are embedded in the
low-dimensional space. This is the core idea of the paper,
summarizing the high-dimensional data in a space of much
lower dimension without losing important features for clas-
sification. To implement the r.h.s objective, the constraint
on QZ can be relaxed by adding a penalty term. The final
objective of OT-Classifier is:
inf
Q(Z|X)∈Q
EPXEQ(Z|X) {`(f(X),C(Z))}+ λD(QZ , PZ),
(2)
whereQ is any nonparametric set of probabilistic encoders,
λ > 0 is a hyper-parameter andD is an arbitrary divergence
betweenQZ and PZ .
To estimate the divergences between QZ and PZ , we
apply a GAN-based framework, fitting a discriminator to
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minimize the 1-Wasserstein distance betweenQZ and PZ :
W (QZ , PZ) = inf
Γ∈P(Z˜∼QZ ,Z∼PZ)
E(Z˜,Z)∼Γ‖Z˜ − Z‖.
We have also tried the Jsensen-Shannon divergence, but as
expected, Wasserstein distance provides more stable train-
ing and better results. When training the framework, the
weight clipping method proposed in Wasserstein GAN [1]
is applied to help stabilize the training of discriminatorDγ .
4. Experiments
In this section, we compare the performance of our pro-
posed algorithm (OT-Classifier) with other state-of-the-art
defense methods on several benchmark datasets:
• MNIST [13]: handwritten digit dataset, which consists
of 60, 000 training images and 10, 000 testing images.
Theses are 28× 28 black and white images in ten dif-
ferent classes.
• CIFAR10 [11]: natural image dataset, which contains
50, 000 training images and 10, 000 testing images in
ten different classes. These are low resolution 32× 32
color images.
• STL10 [7]: color image dataset similar to CIFAR10,
but contains only 5, 000 training images and 8, 000
testing images in ten different classes. The images are
of higher resolution 96× 96.
• Tiny Imagenet [8]: a subset of Imagenet dataset. Tiny
Imagenet has 200 classes, and each class has 500 train-
ing images, 50 testing images, making it a challenging
benchmark for defense task. The resolution of the im-
ages is 64× 64.
Various defense methods have been proposed to improve
the robustness of deep neural networks. Here we com-
pare our algorithm with state-of-the-art methods that are
robust in white-box setting. Madry’s adversarial training
(Madry’s Adv) is proposed in [17], which has been rec-
ognized as one of the most successful defense method in
white-box setting, as shown in [2].
Random Self-Ensemble (RSE) method introduced by
[15] adds stochastic components in the neural network,
achieving similar performance to Madry’s adversarial train-
ing algorithm.
Another method we would like to compare with is
Defense-GAN [24]. It first trains a generative adversar-
ial network to model the distribution of the training data.
At inference time, it finds a close output to the input im-
age and feed that output into the classifier. This process
“projects” input images onto the range of GAN’s genera-
tor, which helps remove the effect of adversarial perturba-
tions. In [24], the author demonstrated the performance of
Defense-GAN on MNIST and Fashion-MNIST, so we will
compare our method with Defense-GAN on MNIST.
Optimal transport classifier can be combined with other
state-of-the-art defense methods. In general, Madry’s ad-
versarial training is more robust than RSE, so we combine
OT-Classifier with adversarial training (OT-CLA+Adv) in
our experiments.
4.1. Evaluate Models Under White-box l∞-PGD At-
tack
In this section, we evaluate the defense methods against
l∞-PGD untargeted attack, which is one of the strongest
white-box attack methods. Starting from x0 = xo, PGD
attack conducts projected gradient descent iteratively to up-
date the adversarial example:
xt+1 = Π
{
xt + α · sign
(
∇x`
(
M(xt), yo
))}
,
where M is the targeted model, Π is the projection to the
set {x| ‖x− xo‖∞ ≤ }, yo is the label of xo, and α is the
step size. It is obvious that larger  allows larger distortion
of the original image. Models are evaluated under different
distortion level (), and the larger the distortion the stronger
the attack. Depending on the image scale and type, different
datasets are sensitive to different strength of attack.
Models on MNIST are evaluated under distortion level
from 0 to 0.4 by 0.025. Models on CIFAR10 and STL10
are evaluated under  ∈ [0, 0.06, 0.005]. Models on Tiny
Imagenet are evaluated under  ∈ [0, 0.02, 0.002]. As men-
tioned in the notation part, all the distortion levels are re-
ported in the normalized [0, 1] space. The experimental re-
sults are shown in Figure 2. To demonstrate the results more
clearly, we show part of the results in Table 1.
Data Defense 0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4
MNIST Adv. Training 99.2 97.3 86.8 35.4 2.7OT-CLA+Adv 99.1 98.7 97.2 94.9 71.1
Data Defense 0 0.015 0.03 0.045 0.06
CIFAR10 Adv. Training 82.6 68.0 42.3 21.6 12.0OT-CLA+Adv 84.0 67.5 51.3 35.8 23.3
STL10 Adv. Training 63.6 53.5 36.8 25.0 18.7OT-CLA+Adv 60.7 52.1 40.3 30.6 24.5
Data Defense 0 0.004 0.01 0.016 0.02
Tiny Imagenet Adv. Training 57.3 48.6 26.5 15.1 12.0OT-CLA+Adv 54.6 50.0 36.7 25.6 21.1
Table 1. Testing accuracy (%) under different strength of PGD at-
tacks. The table shows the results of OT-CLA+Adv and Madry’s
adversarial training (Adv. Training). The better accuracy is
marked in bold.
Based on Figure 2 and Table 1, we can see that OT-
Classifier can improve the robustness of deep neural net-
works. Compare the performance of OT-Classifier with the
performance of model without defense method, we can see
that OT-Classifier is much more robust than the model with
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Figure 2. Testing accuracy under l∞-PGD attack on four different datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10, STL10 and Tiny Imagenet.
no defense method on all benchmark datasets. Besides,
when the distortion level () is large, OT-Classifier tends
to perform better than other state-of-the-art defense meth-
ods on MNIST, CIFAR10 and Tiny Imagenet. This phe-
nomenon is obvious on CIFAR10 and it even performs bet-
ter than OT-CLA+Adv when the attack strength is strong.
In general, OT-Classifier combined with adversarial
training (OT-CLA+Adv) is the most robust one on a vari-
ety of datasets. Though, on some datasets, when there is
no attack, the testing accuracy of OT-CLA+Adv are slightly
worse than Madry’s adversarial training.
We also compare Defense-GAN with our method OT-
CLA+Adv on MNIST. Both methods are evaluated against
the l2-C&W untargeted attack, one of the strongest white-
box attack proposed in [4]. Defense-GAN is evaluated us-
ing the method proposed in [2], and the code is available on
github 2. OT-CLA+Adv is evaluated against l2-C&W untar-
geted attack with the same hyper-parameter values as those
used in the evaluation of Defense-GAN. The results under
l2 ≤ 0.005 threshold are shown in Table 2.
Method Testing Accuracy
Defense-GAN 55.0
OT-CLA+Adv 99.1
Table 2. Testing accuracy (%) of two defense methods under C&W
attack with l2 ≤ 0.005.
Based on Table 2, OT-CLA+Adv is much more robust
than Defense-GAN under the l2 ≤ 0.005 threshold.
4.2. Evaluate the Effect of Discriminator
OT-Classifier framework consists of three parts, and the
classification task is done by the encoder Qφ and classifier
Cτ . Without the discriminator part, the encoder can also
project the input images to a low-dimensional space. How-
ever, arbitrarily projecting the images to a low-dimensional
space with only the encoder part can not improve the robust-
ness of the model. In contrast, sometimes it even decreases
the robustness of the model.
To show that arbitrarily projecting the input images to
a low-dimensional space can not improve the robustness,
we fit a framework with only the encoder and classifier part
2Publicly available at https://github.com/anishathalye/
obfuscated-gradients/tree/master/defensegan
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Figure 3. Testing accuracy of E-CLA and OT-Classifier under l∞-
PGD attack on four different datasets: MNIST, CIFAR10, STL10
and Tiny Imagenet. We adopt the same encoder and classifier
structures for the two models.
(E-CLA), where the encoder and classifier have the same
structures as in OT-Classifier, and compare E-CLA with the
OT-Classifier framework. The results are shown in Figure 3.
Based on Figure 3, we can observe that OT-Classifier is
much more robust than just the encoder and classifier struc-
ture on MNIST, CIFAR10 and Tiny Imagenet. It is also
more robust on STL10 but not that much. The reason might
be that there are only 5, 000 training images in STL10 and
the resolution is 96 × 96. Therefore, it is harder to learn a
good embedding with limited amount of images. However,
even when the number of training images is limited, OT-
Classifier is still much more robust than the E-CLA struc-
ture. This observation demonstrates that OT-Classifier is
able to learn a robust embedding. Notice that the perfor-
mance of E-CLA structure is similar to the performance of
model without defense method on CIFAR10, STL10 and
Tiny Imagenet, and worse on MNIST, which means the ro-
bustness of OT-Classifier does not come from the structure
design.
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4.3. Dimension of Embedding Space
One important hyper-parameter for the OT-Classifier is
the dimension of the embedding space. If the dimension is
too small, important features are “collapsed” onto the same
dimension, and if the dimension is too large, the projec-
tion will not extract useful information, which results in too
much noise and instability. The maximum likelihood es-
timation of intrinsic dimension proposed in [14]3 is used
to calculate the intrinsic dimension of each image dataset,
serving as a guide for selecting the embedding dimension.
The sample size used in calculating the intrinsic dimen-
sion is 1, 000, and changing the sample size does not in-
fluence the results much. Based on the intrinsic dimension
calculated by [14], we test several different values around
the suggested intrinsic dimension and evaluate the models
against l∞-PGD attack. The experimental results are shown
in Figure 4.
The final embedding dimension is chosen based on ro-
bustness, number of parameters, and testing accuracy when
there is no attack. The final embedding dimensions and sug-
gested intrinsic dimensions are shown in Table 3.
Data Data dim. Intrinsic dim. Embedding dim.
MNIST 1× 28× 28 13 4
CIFAR10 3× 32× 32 17 16
STL10 3× 96× 96 20 16
Tiny Imagenet 3× 64× 64 19 20
Table 3. Pixel space dimension, intrinsic dimension calculated
by [14], and final embedding dimension used.
Based on Figure 4, the embedding dimension close to the
calculated intrinsic dimension usually offers better results
except on MNIST. One explanation may be that MNIST is
a simple handwritten digit dataset, so performing classifica-
tion on MNIST may not require that many dimensions.
4.4. Embedding Visualization
In this section, we compare the embedding learned by
Encoder+Classifier structure (E-CLA) and the embedding
learned by OT-Classifier on several datasets. We first gen-
erate embedding of testing data using the encoder (z˜ =
Qφ(x)), then project the embedding points (z˜) to 2-D space
by tSNE[16]. Then we generate adversarial images (xadv)
against E-CLA and OT-Classifier using l∞-PGD attack.
The adversarial embedding is generated by feeding the ad-
versarial images into the encoder (z˜adv = Qφ(xadv)). Fi-
nally, we project the adversarial embedding points (z˜adv) to
2-D space. The results are shown in Figure 5. The plots
in the first row are embedding visualization plots for E-
CLA, and the plots in the second row are the embedding
3Code publicly available at https://github.com/OFAI/
hub-toolbox-python3
visualization plots for OT-Classifier. In adversarial embed-
ding visualization plots, the misclassified point is marked as
“down triangle”, which means the PGD attack successfully
changed the prediction, and the correctly classified point is
marked as “point”, which means the attack fails.
Based on Figure 5, we can see that E-CLA can learn
a good embedding on legitimate images of MNIST. Em-
bedding points for different classes are separated on the
2D space, but under adversarial attack, some embedding
points of different classes are mixed together. However,
OT-Classifier can generate good separated embeddings on
both legitimate and adversarial images. On CIFAR10, the
E-CLA can not generate good separated embeddings on
either legitimate images or adversarial images, while OT-
Classifier can generate good separated embeddings for both.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we propose a new defense framework,
OT-Classifier, which projects the input images to a low-
dimensional space to remove adversarial perturbation and
stabilize the model through minimizing the discrepancy be-
tween the true label distribution and the framework output
distribution. We empirically show that OT-CLA+Adv is
much more robust than other state-of-the-art defense meth-
ods on several benchmark datasets. Future work will in-
clude further exploration of the low-dimensional space to
improve the robustness of deep neural network.
6. Appendix
6.1. Proof of Theorem 1
The proof of Theorem 1 is adapted from the proof of
Theorem 1 in [27]. Consider certain sets of joint proba-
bility distributions of three random variables (X,U,Z) ∈
X × U × Z . X can be taken as the input images, U as
the output of the framework, and Z as the latent codes.
PC,Z(U,Z) represents a joint distribution of a variable pair
(U,Z), where Z is first sampled from PZ and then U from
PC(U |Z). PC defined in (1) is the marginal distribution of
U when (U,Z) ∼ PC,Z .
The joint distributions Γ(X,U) or couplings between
values of X and U can be written as Γ(X,U) =
Γ(U |X)PX(X) due to the marginal constraint. Γ(U |X)
can be decomposed into an encoding distribution Q(Z|X)
and the generating distribution PC(U |Z), and Theorem 1
mainly shows how to factor it through Z.
In the first part, we will show that if PC(U |Z) are Dirac
measures, we have
inf
Γ∈P(X∼PX ,U∼PC)
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)}
= inf
Γ∈PX,U
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)} , (3)
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Figure 4. Testing accuracy of models with different embedding dimensions under l∞-PGD attack.
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Figure 5. 2D embeddings for E-CLA and OT-Classifier on MNIST and CIFAR10. See larger plots in Supplementary.
whereP(X ∼ PX , U ∼ PC) denotes the set of all joint dis-
tributions of (X,U) with marginals PX , PC , and likewise
for P(X ∼ PX , Z ∼ PZ). The set of all joint distribu-
tions of (X,U,Z) such that X ∼ PX , (U,Z) ∼ PC,Z , and
(U ⊥ X)|Z are denoted by PX,U,Z . PX,U and PX,Z de-
note the sets of marginals on (X,U) and (X,Z) induced by
PX,U,Z .
From the definition, it is clear that PX,U ⊆ P(PX , PC).
Therefore, we have
inf
Γ∈P(X∼PX ,U∼PC)
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)}
≤ inf
Γ∈PX,U
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)} , (4)
The identity is satisfied if PC(U |Z) are Dirac measures,
such asU = C(Z). This is proved by the following Lemma
in [27].
Lemma 1 PX,U ⊆ P(PX , PC) with identity if PC(U |Z =
z) are Dirac for all z ∈ Z . (see details in [27].)
In the following part, we show that
inf
Γ∈PX,U
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)}
= inf
Q:QZ=PZ
EPXEQ(Z|X) {`(f(X),C(Z))} . (5)
Based on the definition, P(PX , PC), PX,U,Z and PX,U de-
pend on the choice of conditional distributions PC(U |Z),
but PX,Z does not. It is also easy to check that PX,Z =
P(X ∼ PX , Z ∼ PZ). The tower rule of expectation, and
the conditional independence property of PX,U,Z implies
inf
Γ∈PX,U
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)}
= inf
Γ∈PX,U,Z
E(X,U,Z)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)}
= inf
Γ∈PX,U,Z
EPZEX∼P (X|Z)EU∼P (U |Z) {`(f(X), U)}
= inf
Γ∈PX,U,Z
EPZEX∼P (X|Z) {`(f(X),C(Z))}
= inf
Γ∈PX,Z
E(X,Z)∼Γ {`(f(X),C(Z))}
= inf
Q:QZ=PZ
EPXEQ(Z|X) {`(f(X),C(Z))} (6)
Finally, since Y = f(X), it is easy to get
inf
Γ∈P(Y∼PY ,U∼PC)
E(Y,U)∼Γ {`(Y,U)}
= inf
Γ∈P(X∼PX ,U∼PC)
E(X,U)∼Γ {`(f(X), U)} (7)
Now (3), (5) and (7) are proved and the three together prove
Theorem 1.
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Supplementary
A. Tuning Epsilon
Epsilon () is an important hyper-parameter for adversarial training. When doing Madry’s adversarial training, we test the
model robustness with different  and choose the best one. The experiment results are shown in Figure 6.
Based on Figure 6, we use  = 0.3, 0.03, 0.03 in Madry’s adversarial training on MNIST, CIFAR10 and STL10 respec-
tively. For Tiny Imagenet, we use  = 0.01. To make a fair comparison, we use the same  when training OT-CLA+Adv.
Code for OT-Classifier will be made public later on github.
B. Embedding Visualization
In this subsection, we show larger version of Figure 5 for clearer view. Figure 7 and Figure 8 are embedding visualization
plots on MNIST. Figure 9 and Figure 10 are embedding visualization plots on CIFAR10. The plot on the left is the 2D
embedding generated from the legitimate images. The one on the right is the 2D embedding generated from adversarial
images. Same for all four plots.
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Figure 6. Testing accuracy of models with different  on MNIST, CIFAR10 and STL10.
Original Embedding of E-CLA on MNIST Adversarial Embedding of E-CLA on MNIST
Classified Right
Classified Wrong
Figure 7. 2D embedding for E-CLA on MNIST.
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Figure 8. 2D embedding for OT-Classifier on MNIST.
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Figure 9. 2D embedding for E-CLA on CIFAR10.
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Figure 10. 2D embedding for OT-Classifier on CIFAR10.
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